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Invested in the Outcome: When the Judge
Owns Stock in the Victim of the Crime
Andrew L. Wrightt

A federal judge owns one thousand shares of stock in a major
metropolitan bank that are worth $10,000. Gun drawn, a masked
man robs the bank, making off with the contents of its vault. After FBI agents catch the robber, the United States Attorney
charges him with bank robbery. May the judge preside over the
criminal case?
The federal judicial disqualification statute1 does not provide
a clear answer. Instead, the law imposes on judges with this potential conflict of interest the duty to decide whether their "impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Does a judge's stock
ownership in the victim of a crime make it reasonable to question
the judge's impartiality?
Few federal courts have addressed this question. Those that
have disagree over whether the general impartiality requirement
of 28 USC § 455(a) prohibits such stock ownership.' Moreover,
those courts that have held that a judge's stock ownership may
require disqualification disagree over the precise dollar value of
t
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1 28 USC § 455 (1994). The provisions for disqualifying federal judges are outlined

in 28 USC § 455, 28 USC § 144 (1994), and American Bar Association ("ABA7) Model Code
of JudicialConduct Canon 3 (ABA 1990) ("Model Code"). Federal judges must follow only
those rules set out in the statutes. See Nobles v Commissioner, InternalRevenue Service,
105 F3d 436, 438 (9th Cir 1997) (explaining that unless a court formally adopts the Model
Code, "judges may voluntarily adhere to it, [but] the code provides no authority"). Most
judges look to the Model Code for guidance and instruction as well. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 Brooklyn L Rev 589, 631 (1987). A judge may
seek an opinion on whether he should disqualify himself from a case by submitting an
inquiry to the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Rule of Procedure 2 (1989); see also
Donald C. Nugent, JudicialBias, 42 Clev St L Rev 1, 27-28 (1994). The ABA has not
issued an opinion on the problem considered in this Comment.
2 28 USC § 455(a). Canon 3E of the Model Code mimics this language: "A judge
shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned...." Model Code Canon 3.
1 Compare United States v Nobel, 696 F2d 231, 235-36 (3d Cir 1982) ("We adopt the
view that a judge who owns a substantial interest in the victim of a crime must disqualify
himself or herself in the subsequent criminal proceeding because the strict overarching
standard imposed by [28 USC §] 455(a) requires that the appearance of impartiality be
maintained.") with United States v Sellers, 566 F2d 884, 888 (4th Cir 1977) (holding that
judge's interest was too "remote" to merit disqualification despite dissent's view that the
interest was "substantial").
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stock necessary to give rise to a § 455(a) violation."
This Comment argues that a judge's ownership of stock in a
victim should require disqualification from the criminal trial in
all instances." Even if the criminal trial will not affect the financial well-being of the company, the judge's partial ownership of
the victim gives rise to the appearance of impropriety, if not actual bias. For example, a judge who owns stock in the victim may
have a psychic interest as well as a financial one in the outcome
of the case. To resolve the current ambiguity in the law and aid
judges in making the recusal decision, the courts should adopt a
rule of automatic disqualification. Such a rule would help ensure
that criminal defendants receive fair trials and protect public confidence in the justice system while imposing only a minimal burden on the courts.
Part I of this Comment examines the ambiguous language of
the judicial disqualification statute's impartiality requirement
and the resulting split among the federal circuits over whether a
stockowning judge must disqualify himself. Part II examines the
4 Compare United States v Ravich, 421 F2d 1196, 1205 (2d Cir 1970) (deeming a
stock interest of between $10,000 and $15,000 "not merely unsubstantial but nonexistent"
under an earlier version of § 455), with Nobel, 696 F2d at 235-36, (discussing Ravich's
holding and "concludling] otherwise" on grounds that an interest of between $10,000 and
$15,000 could lead to a reasonable apprehension of partiality).
5 This Comment uses the terms "disqualification" and "recusal" interchangeably.
These terms once had distinct meanings - recusal meant withdrawal at the judge's discretion and disqualification meant exclusion by force of law - but that distinction no
longer exists. See Comment, Disqualificationof FederalJudges for Bias or Prejudice, 46
U Chi L Rev 236, 237 n 5 (1978), citing John P. Frank, Disqualificationof Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 L & Contemp Prob 43, 45 (1970); see also Mark T. Coberly, Caesar's Wife Revisited - JudicialDisqualificationAfter the 1974 Amendments, 34 Wash &
Lee L Rev 1201, 1201 n 5 (1977). Today, "disqualification is mandated in virtually all
cases where recusal is appropriate." Comment, 46 U Chi L Rev at 237 n 5.
6 Commentators have previously argued the benefits of a rigid rule of automatic
disqualification when the judge has a financial interest in a party. See, for example, Seth
E. Bloom, JudicialBias and FinancialInterest as Grounds for Disqualificationof Federal
Judges, 35 Case W L Rev 662, 699 (1985); Note, DisqualificationofJudges and Justices in
the FederalCourts, 86 Harv L Rev 736, 746-47 (1973). However, no one has yet advanced
applying such a rule to a judge who owns stock in the victim of a crime and who is assigned to try the alleged criminal. One author, in fact, has argued against a per se rule for
a judge's indirect financial interest. Id at 752-53 (deeming such a rule "inappropriate" on
remoteness and administrability grounds).
This Comment addresses only the problem of stock ownership in the victim of a
crime. It does not discuss the issue of stock ownership in a company whose stock price
might be affected by the disposition of a trial to which another company is a party. See,
for example, In re Placid Oil Co, 802 F2d 783, 786-87 (5th Cir 1986) (recusal not required
where judge owned stock in company in same industry as party). It also does not address
the problem of a judge who is a member of an extremely large class of consumers that
might benefit from the disposition of the trial. See, for example, In re New Mexico Natural
Gas Antitrust Litigation, 620 F2d 794, 796 (10th Cir 1980) (judge's financial interest as an
energy consumer in lower energy rates not sufficient to require recusal).
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problems posed by such stock ownership and advances five arguments for adopting a rule requiring a stock-owning judge to disqualify himself automatically.
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL CONFLICT: MUST A JUDGE WHO OWNS
STOCK IN THE VICTIM OF THE CRIME DISQUALIFY HIMSELF?
A judge's ownership of stock in the victim might initially
seem to fall under the province of the financial interest provision
of the disqualification statute. This provision requires a judge to
recuse himself when he knows that he, or a family member, has a
financial interest in a party or subject before him.7 However, the
courts have recognized that an interest in the crime victim is neither an interest in a party nor an interest in the subject matter of
the case -8
Even if the party and subject matter disqualification provisions do not apply, two other provisions do. First, courts still
must abide by the general disqualification provision of § 455(a).
This provision holds that: "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'
Second, 28
USC § 455(b)(4) requires a judge to disqualify himself if he possesses any interest that could be "substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding." Neither of these two provisions specifically addresses the stock ownership problem considered here,
and the federal circuits have disagreed over whether either or
both require disqualification in such a situation."°
The Fourth Circuit has most openly embraced the position
that stock ownership in the victim does not require judicial disqualification. In United States v Sellers," a bank robbery case,
the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by
7

Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself when

[hie knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor
child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
28 USC § 455(b)(4). The statute specifies that "financial interest' means ownership of a
legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other
active participant in the affairs of a party .. ."28 USC § 455(d)(4).
8 See, for example, Unites States v Nobel, 696 F2d 231, 235-36 (3d Cir 1982).
9 28 USC §455(a).
10 The Ninth Circuit noted this discord in United States v Rogers, 119 F3d 1377,
1383-84 (9th Cir 1997). The Second Circuit had previously noted this split in Hardy v
United States, 878 F2d 94, 95 n 1 (2d Cir 1989).
11 566 F2d 884 (4th Cir 1977).
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refusing to disqualify himself despite the fact that he and his
family owned stock in the victim bank.' Even the fact that the
judge's brother served as chairman of the bank's board of directors and its holding company13 did not require recusal." Rather,
in a ruling that commentators have criticized, 5 the Fourth Circuit held that the judge's interest was too "remote.""
The Sellers ruling followed two opinions in the early 1970s
from the Second and Fifth Circuits, which held that a judge who
owns a "small" amount of stock in a corporation victimized by a
crime need not recuse himself.'7 In United States v Ravich,' the
judge in a bank robbery trial disclosed that he owned 325 shares
of stock in the bank, worth between $10,000 and $15,000.' On
appeal, the Second Circuit held that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion by declining to disqualify himself "considering
[that] the amount [of stock] was so small.
2
On similar facts, the Fifth Circuit in United States v Harris
12

Id at 885-87.

13 There is arguably no meaningful distinction between a holding company which

owns all of the bank's stock and the bank itself. Id at 888 n 6 (Butzner concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
14

Id at 887.

See, for example, Donald R. Fretz, Rodney A. Peeples and Thomas C. Wicker, Ethics for Judges 27 (National Judicial College of the ABA 1982) (advising judges to disqualify themselves in Sellers-like situations).
16 566 F2d at 887. The court explained that because the trial judge owned "less than
1/25th of 1%" of the bank's stock, "any interest the judge might possibly have in the case is
so remote as to be for all practical purposes non-existent." Id. The Seventh Circuit, quoting Sellers, has noted with approval this size-of-the-interest based analysis. United States
v Lampe, 1996 US App LEXIS 26177, *10-11 (7th Cir) (observing that judge's stock ownership in bank allegedly robbed by defendant was "peripheral and inconsequential," but
not reaching merits ofissue because improperly preserved for appeal).
17 United States v Ravich, 421 F2d 1196 (2d Cir 1970), and United States v Harris,
458 F2d 670 (5th Cir 1972), were decided before the redrafting of 28 USC § 455 in 1974.
The pre-1974 version of the statute provided:
'5

Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or
his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the
trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
28 USC § 455 (1970), amended by Pub L No 93-512, 88 Stat 1609 (1974). At least one
court thought that this earlier version of § 455 allowed a judge greater leeway than the
current version when deciding whether to recuse himself. See Nobel, 696 F2d at 235. The
redrafting has not affected how courts analyze this problem: Sellers, decided under the
modern version of the statute, cited Ravich with approval. Sellers, 566 F2d at 887.
18 421 F2d 1196 (2d Cir 1970).
19 Id at 1205.
20 Id at 1205-06. The judge's holdings represented .0072% of the bank's 5,391,527
shares. Id at 1205.
21 458 F2d 670 (5th Cir 1972).
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followed the Ravich court's approach and looked to the size of the
judge's interest.' The Harris court also came to the same ultimate conclusion, observing that:
[T]he fact that the trial judge owned a small amount of
stock in the holding company that had some control over
the group of banks of which the burglarized bank was a
member, a fact which the trial judge disclosed at trial,
does not, in our opinion, render him personally biased.'
Both Harrisand Ravich rest on the rationale that the judge
did not hold a financial interest of sufficient size to merit disqualification, but neither court said how much stock would necessitate disqualification. Moreover, neither court considered the
argument that even a small, indirect financial interest in the outcome might reasonably invite questions about the judge's impartiality.
The Third Circuit has rejected the reasoning of Sellers and
its predecessors. In United States v Nobel,. the court held that a
judge who owns "a substantial interest" in the victim of a crime
must disqualify himself.' Like the judge in Ravich, the trial
judge had owned stock in the victim worth between $10,000 and
$15,000. However, the Nobel opinion emphasized that a judge
must maintain "the appearance of impartiality,' and explained
that stock ownership in the victim undermines this goal.' On
this basis, the Nobel court rejected Ravich and held that "a judge
who owns a substantial interest in the victim of a crime must
disqualify himself or herself in the subsequent criminal proceeding.' The court based this ruling on the importance of main-

2Id

23

Id.

at 678.

696 F2d 231 (3d Cir 1982).
Id at 235-36. Section 455 prohibits a judge from possessing an "interest that could
be substantially affected," but is silent as to whether a judge may possess a substantial
interest. 28 USC § 455(bX4) (1994). The court's consideration of whether a "substantial
interest" existed is thus incorrect. See Virginia Electric & Power Co v Sun Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co, 407 F Supp 324, 330 (E D Va 1976) (noting "the drastic literal difference
between a 'substantial interest' and 'any... interest that could be substantially affected").
The Nobel court's use of the term "substantial interest" probably stems from the language
of the pre-1974 version of 28 USC § 455. See note 17. The Nobel court's analysis is surprising, however, since Nobel was decided in 1982, almost a decade after the redrafting.
One could perhaps attribute use of the term to reliance on the pre-1974 treatments of this
issue which employed a substantiality test.
2
696 F2d at 235-36 & n 8.
27Id
at 235.
28 Id at 235-36.
2

25
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taining public confidence in the judiciary:
[O]ne of the principal functions of a judicial disqualification statute is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, which in turn depends on a belief in the impersonality of judicial decisionmaking. We
adopt the view that... the strict overarching standard
imposed by [28 USC §] 455(a) requires that the appearance of impartiality be maintained.
The Fifth Circuit has also embraced a version of the Third
Circuit's argument favoring disqualification. The court addressed
the issue in First National Bank of Louisville v Lustig,' a case
involving insurance fraud committed by a former employee of a
bank.31 Sureties of the bank argued that the court should set
aside the former employee's guilty plea because the judge who
accepted the defendant's plea owned between $100,000 and
$200,000 of stock in the bank.32 In its ruling, the court "express[ed its] dismay at [the judge's] failure to automatically recuse himself from [the] criminal case in light of his substantial
interest in" the bank.' The Fifth Circuit, albeit in dicta, suggested that § 455 "clearly disqualified" the judge from hearing the
criminal case.'
The Ninth Circuit addressed this division among the federal
courts in United States v Rogers.' Kent Rogers pled guilty to defrauding the Bank of America, and the court sentenced him to
eight years in prison and ordered him to repay $70.7 million to
the bank.'
Rogers appealed his sentence and, on remand, the
same judge who had originally sentenced Rogers eliminated the
restitution order. The judge had, between the time Rogers re29 Id at 235-36 (citation omitted). The Third Circuit, however, did not reverse the
defendant's conviction. Id at 238. It held that the parties had waived their right to object
to the judge's financial interest under 28 USC § 455(e) because after the judge had disclosed his financial position, counsel neither requested further information nor objected at
any time during the five-day trial. Id at 236. See also Richard E. Flamm, JudicialDisqualification:Recusal and Disqualificationof Judges § 24.9.2 at 715-716 (Little, Brown
1996).
30 96 F3d 1554 (5th Cir 1996).
31 Id at 1559.
2 Id at 1561 & n 5. The judge offered to recuse himself but both parties declined. Id
at 1561.
33 Id at 1574.
34 96 F3d at 1561 n 6.
35 119 F3d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir 1997).
3Id at 1379.
37 Id.
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ceived his first and second sentences, inadvertently acquired a
financial interest in Bank of America.' The Ninth Circuit, in its
review of the case, held that the judge's stock ownership at the
time of the second sentencing was a "limited financial interest"
that did "not appear to raise a reasonable question of impartiality." Noting that the judge's resentencing did not include a restitution order, the court reasoned that "the resentencing of
Rogers could not have had any possible financial impact on the
Bank of America."'

Thus, the court concluded no reasonable per-

son "would objectively conclude that the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned."
Thus, the federal circuit courts which have addressed the
issue of a judge's ownership of stock in the victim of a crime have
failed to adopt a consistent approach. Several circuits permit a
judge to try a case in which he owns even a substantial amount of
stock in the victim of a crime. Two circuits do not allow a judge
to own a "substantial" amount of stock in the victim, but neither
has explained what "substantial" means. This confusion indicates the need for adopting a clear rule to address the problem
presented by a judge's stock ownership.
II. AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION FOR JUDGES WHO OWN STOCK
IN THE VICTIM OF A CRIME

There are several compelling reasons for requiring automatic
disqualification of a judge from a criminal trial when the judge
owns stock in the victim of the crime. First, a judge's stock ownership creates a conflict of interest in violation of § 455(b)(4): the
judge can benefit financially from his own rulings because of their
effects on the corporation's revenues, which in turn may influence
the value of the corporation's stock. Additionally, a judge's stock
ownership might influence his decisionmaking because of psychic,
rather than financial, interests such as loyalty to the company.
The drafters of the disqualification statute intended to eliminate
such conflicts of interest. Second, even if no actual bias exists,
the conflict of interest present when the judge owns stock in the
victim gives rise to the appearance of impropriety in violation of §
8 Id at 1379. As a result of a merger between two banks, the judge acquired stock in
Bank of America. Id. In addition, Bank of America took over a lease on some of the
judge's property during the merger. Id. The Ninth Circuit did not disclose the value of
the judge's stock and property. Id at 1379-80.
39 119 F3d at 1384.
40
41

Id.

Id.
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455(a). The appearance of impropriety contradicts the legislative
intent of the disqualification statute by undermining public faith
in the integrity of the justice system. Third, a trial before a judge
with a financial or other interest in the outcome may compromise
a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Fourth, empirical evidence indicates that judges often do not know when to recuse themselves and would prefer a bright line rule. Finally, establishing a bright line rule requiring automatic disqualification
would impose minimal cost. These considerations, taken together, indicate that a rule mandating automatic disqualification
would be preferable to the current discretionary standard.
A. Conflict of Interest
28 USC § 455(b)(4) requires a judge to disqualify himself if he
possesses any interest, not just a financial one, that could be
"substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. 2 According to this provision, a judge may possess a "substantial interest" in the company victimized by a crime and still preside at
the criminal trial, so long as that interest cannot be "substantially affected."' Thus, the size-of-the-interest test employed by
some federal courts" lacks statutory foundation.45 These courts
incorrectly focused on how much stock a particular judge owned
rather than whether any financial interest of the judge's, however
small, could be "substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding."'
A judge can reap financial benefit, to consider just one kind
of prohibited interest, when presiding over the trial of a person
accused of victimizing a corporation in which the judge owns
stock. For example, a judge who owns stock in a bank which is
robbed might realize a substantial financial benefit by ordering
restitution or meting out particularly harsh sentences that send a
message to others contemplating similar crimes against the
bank. Yet the federal courts have occasionally ignored this pos42 28 USc § 455(b)(4) (1994). The vague phrase "substantially affected" is difficult to

apply. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Steven Lubet and James J. Alfini, Judicial Conduct and
Ethics § 4.24 at 142 (Michie 1995), discussing In re VirginiaElec & Power Co, 539 F2d 357

(4th Cir 1976).
43 For the difference between a "substantial interest" and an interest that is "substantially affected," see note 25.
44 See, for example, United States v Sellers, 566 F2d 884, 887 (4th Cir 1977).
4 See note 25.
46 28 USC § 455(b)(4) (1994).

47 While potential criminals may not necessarily be deterred by the prospect of winding up in any one judge's courtroom, news of harsh sentences for a particular type of crime
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sibility of judicial self-dealing, especially when the amount of
stock owned was small.' These courts have turned a blind eye to
the fact that a stock-owning judge is literally invested in the outcome.
While all judges - and indeed all members of the general
public who have bank accounts - might have an interest in seeing bank robbers convicted, a "person who has substantial holdings in a bank that is the victim of a robbery has an interest that
is different from the general public in seeing the criminal convicted."9 The judge may be seeking to effect deterrence for "his"
company.' Like surveillance cameras or a security-company logo
conspicuously displayed on a company's place of business, a history of severe penalties for those caught victimizing a corporation
can deter future crimes.5 ' As a result, corporate money that
would otherwise be spent on deterrence and losses from crimes
could be fed back into the corporation's treasury, thereby raising
its stock price.
Even if a judge cannot benefit financially from his stock ownership in the victim, bias may remain. The judge may possess
another type of prohibited interest in the disposition of the case
beyond the mere fiscal.' For example, a judge's sense of loyalty'
to the company in which he owns stock may influence him to
punish more severely those who harm the company.' Such feelmay deter future commission of that type of crime, perhaps even against that particular
target. See Note, IndeterminateSentencing: An Analysis of Sentencing in America, 70 S

Cal L Rev 1717, 1720-21 (1997). Moreover, "recidivists are specifically deterred from
future criminal acts because of the punishment they have already faced and the harsh
punishment that awaits them should they be convicted again." Id at 1721.
" See, for example, Sellers, 566 F2d at 888.
49 Id at 884, 888.
50 Id.
11 Hence

the existence of signs warning "Shoplifters Prosecuted to the Full Extent of

the Law."
52 Commentators have been slow to recognize that a judge's bias against a criminal
defendant can take forms beyond a desire to reap financial benefit. For example, one

commentator analyzed the Nobel court's decision not to require disqualification strictly in
the context of possible financial benefit. Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for

JudicialDisqualificationin FederalCourts, 72 Neb L Rev 1046, 1073 n 96 (1993) ("Without a connection to the judge's financial interest, the case did not draw his interest into
the subject matter of the controversy.").
5 See Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude,and the Federal Judiciary,44 Am U L Rev
699 (1995); James Zagel and Adam Winkler, The Independence of Judges, 46 Mercer L Rev
795, 822-23 (1995).
14 Revenge may stem from an emotional desire for vengeance or from a rational cal-

culus of the benefits realized from future deterrence. In the case of the former, acts of
revenge subordinate rational cost calculations, while in the latter, acts of revenge reflect a
systematic approach to deterring future aggression. See Richard A. Posner, Law and
Literature 27-33 (Harvard 1988) (discussing the rational and emotional strains of the
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ings can infect a judge's decisionmaking in spite of the judge's
best efforts to maintain impartiality.'
A biased judge has many opportunities to harm a defendant
during a criminal trial. While sentencing provides perhaps the
most troubling example of such an opportunity, bias can also infect discretionary rulings, such as those on the admissibility of
evidence, to which an appellate court would accord deference on
appeal. Alternatively, a judge attempting to avoid even the appearance of impropriety might overcompensate and be too lenient
toward the defendant.'
Congress intended 28 USC § 455 to reflect zero tolerance for
financial interests, "however small. 7 Congress explained that
this policy would avoid "uncertainty and ambiguity about what is
a "substantial' interest.'
Congress's discussion of the irrelevance of the size of the financial interest exposes as erroneous the
size-based rationale embraced by the Sellers, Ravich, Harris and
Rogers courts as justification for not requiring disqualification.'
That the judge who owns stock in the victim technically does
not possess an interest in a party or in the subject matter in controversy does not imply that the judge should succeed in avoiding
disqualification. The disqualification statute explicitly recognizes
that a judge can have a financial interest in a case "other" than
those defined narrowly as "in a party to the proceeding" or in "the
subject matter in controversy, yet the courts have virtually ignored this provision.'
Finally, 28 USC § 455 itself reflects a preference for recusal
even when a judge's financial interest is minimal. For example,
practice of revenge).
m See Little, 44 Am U L Rev at 727 (cited in note 53) ("Gratitude, loyalty, and social
exchange are the fruit of a complex net of human relationships, the content of the 'historical self from which a judge cannot - and should not - divorce herself upon taking the
bench."). See also Shaman, et al, JudicialConduct and Ethics §4.01 at 96 (cited in note
42) ("[Plartiality is more likely to affect the unconscious thought processes of a judge than
he or she may realize, with the result that the judge has little conscious knowledge of
being swayed by improper influences.").
w On the possibility that a judge may overcompensate to eliminate the appearance of
bias, see Bracy v Gramley, 117 S Ct 1793 (1997) (defendant convicted by judge who himself was later convicted of taking bribes may conduct discovery to determine if judge was
biased against defendant to attempt to compensate for paid-for acquittals). See also Glen
Elasser, Judy Peres and Ken Armstrong, Death row inmate wins appealoverjudge's bribe,
Chi Trib 1 (June 10, 1997). For a discussion of the appearance of impropriety, see Part II

B.
57
58

28 USC § 455(d)(4) (1994).
HR Rep No 93-1453, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 6351,

6356.
59 See Part I.
- 28 USC § 455(bX4) (1994).
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28 USC § 455(b)(4) requires the disqualification of a judge when
he or a family member has even the slightest financial interest in
a party.6 Thus, the statute reflects a preference for accepting the
occasional unnecessary disqualification as the price for a clear
rule ensuring strict avoidance of even the possibility of partiality.' To vindicate this Congressional policy, financial interests
rooted in a judge's ownership of stock in a crime victim should
receive the same treatment. Automatic disqualification of a judge
who owns stock in a victim would serve this goal.'
B. Appearance of Impropriety
Even if § 455(b)(4) does not require disqualification of a judge
who owns stock in the victim of a crime, the judge's interest may
still violate the general impartiality requirement of § 455(a).
This is true even if the judge does not harbor any actual bias
against the defendant. The judge, by virtue of his partial ownership of the victim, has a different relationship with the defendant
than do other members of the non-stock-owning general public. '
The judge's stock ownership is thus problematic because it creates the appearance of impropriety.'
Section 455(a) requires that a judge whose "impartiality
61 -Financial interest' means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however
small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a
party." 28 USC § 455(d)(4). See In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 620
F2d 794, 796 (10th Cir 1980) (requiring recusal "if the judge owned even one share of stock
in a party to the litigation").
62 See Abramson, 72 Neb L Rev at 1071 n 93 (1993) (cited in note 52):

Although the prohibition results in recusal in cases where the interest is
too small to sway even the most mercenary judge, occasional silly results
may be an acceptable price to pay for a rule that both is straightforward
in application and spares the judge from having to make decisions under
an uncertain standard apt to be misunderstood.
Id. It follows that when reasonable persons could differ as to whether a judge should
disqualify himself, a judge should err on the side of recusal. For example, in Nichols v
Alley, 71 F3d 347 (10th Cir 1995) (per curiam), the court held, "If the question of whether
§ 455(a) requires disqualification is a close one, the balance tips in favor of recusal." Id at
352. See also note 67 and accompanying text.
63 See generally Flamm, Judicial Disqualification§ 7.4.2 at 212-13 & n 38 (cited in
note 29).
64 As the dissent in Sellers explained, "any person who has substantial holdings in a
bank that is the victim of a robbery has an interest that is different from the general publie in seeing the criminal convicted." 566 F2d 884, 888 (4th Cir 1977) (Butzner dissenting).
65 As early as 1909, American courts recognized that "there should not be the basis of
a suspicion that [the judge] is biased against the defendant in a criminal case." Anderson
v Commonwealth, 117 SW 364, 369 (Ky 1909) (holding that judge who owned stock in a
bank that was a creditor of another failed bank could not try the criminal case of the person charged with bringing about the debtor-bank's failure).

492

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:

might reasonably be questioned" disqualify himself from the
case.' The legislative history reveals that the disqualification
statute merely requires that the defendant provide an objectively
"reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality."'
A defendant need only show the appearance of partiality to fulfill
the objectively reasonable factual basis requirement of § 455(a) actual bias is not required.' For example, in United States v Lovaglia,u the court held that the proper disqualification inquiry is
whether a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would "conclude that the trial judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned.'o
Because a stock-owning judge possesses a special interest in
the outcome of a case, that "judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned. " The Fourth Circuit has recognized that "[a]
monetary or financial interest is by its very nature such an interest that may generate doubt as to a judge's impartiality. 2 At the
very least, the stock-ownership situation presents a borderline
case, and in such a questionable case, "a judge should exercise his
discretion in favor of disqualification.'
6 28 USC § 455(a) (1994). The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct has embraced a similar
inquiry. See Model Code Commentary to Canon 3(EX1) (cited in note 1) ("A judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless
whether any of the specific rules... apply.").
67 HR Rep No 93-1453 at 6, reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 6351, 6354-55.
68 Hall v Small Business Administration,695 F2d 175, 178-79 (5th Cir 1983) (holding that the test for disqualification under § 455(a) is whether the appearance of partiality, not actual bias, exists). See also United States v Nobel, 696 F2d 231, 235 (3d Cir 1982)
(bias-in-fact not required); United States v Balistrieri,779 F2d 1191, 1204 (7th Cir 1985)
(same); Maldonado Santigago v Velazquez Garcia, 821 F2d 822, 832-33 (1st Cir 1987)
(case reassigned on remand to "preserve appearance of fairness"); Phillipsv Joint Legislative Committee, 637 F2d 1014, 1032 (5th Cir Unit A 1981) (holding that further proceedings should be heard by a different judge to maintain "the complete appearance of impartiality"); Duke v Pfizer, Inc, 668 F Supp 1031, 1035-36 (E D Mich 1987) (explaining that
public's confidence in the justice system "rests on a judge's scrupulous dedication to maintaining the appearance, as well as the fact, of impartiality."). The Ninth Circuit has disagreed, however, and required a showing of bias-in-fact. See, for example, United States v
Sibla, 624 F2d 864, 867-69 (9th Cir 1980). Additionally, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits distinguish between recusal motions based on the appearance of impropriety and
those based on actual bias. See United States v Murphy 768 F2d 1518, 1539-41 (7th Cir
1985); UnitedStates v Slay, 714 F2d 1093, 1094-95 (11th Cir 1983) (per curiam).
69 954 F2d 811 (2d Cir 1992).
70

Id at 815.

28 USC § 455(a). See Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: A
Proposalto Conform Statutory Provisions to UnderlyingPolicies, 67 Iowa L Rev 525, 53233 (1982) (arguing that a judge's indirect financial interest presents a problem due more
to the appearance of impropriety than because of the possibility of judicial self-dealing).
72 In re VirginiaElectric & Power Co, 539 F2d 357, 368 (4th Cir 1976).
73 Matter of Searches Conducted on March 5, 1980, 497 F Supp 1283, 1290 (E D Wis
1980), citing Potashnick v Port City Construction Co, 609 F2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir 1980)
(holding that § 455(a) "clearly mandates that it would be preferable for a judge to err on
71
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When Congress redrafted § 455 in 1974, one of its primary
goals was to improve public opinion about the impartiality of
judges.7 4 The statute was intended "to promote confidence in the
judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety" that
small financial interests might create.75 The importance of public
confidence in judicial propriety commands that judges who own
stock in a crime victim recuse themselves.
The viability of the judicial system depends on the public's
perception of the impartiality of judges.7" Judges themselves acknowledge that public perception is as important to the maintenance of the justice system as how judges actually act." Skepticism regarding judicial impartiality undermines public confidence
in - and ultimately reliance upon - the justice system.78 It is,
therefore, important to ensure that judges appear to be, and are
in fact, impartial.
The proper inquiry in determining whether a judge should
recuse himself, therefore, is whether "it reasonably appears to the
public that the judge can preside impartially." 9 A bright-line rule
requiring disqualification would bolster public confidence in the
judiciary by eliminating the appearance of partiality.'0 Allowing
the side of caution and disqualify himself in a questionable case").
74 Judicial Disqualification:Hearing on S 1064 before Subcommittee on Improvements in JudicialMachinery,Senate Committee on the Judiciary,93d Cong, 1st Sess 1, 74,
76 (1971 and 1973) (statement of Senator Burdick discussing importance of enhancing
"public confidence in the judicial system"; statement of Senator Bayh, discussing goal of
increasing "public confidence in the judiciary"). See Comment, Disqualifying Federal
Judges for Bias: A Considerationof the ExtrajudicialBias Limitation for Disqualification
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 24 Seton Hall L Rev 2057 (1994) (noting "it was the desire to
foster public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary that motivated Congress, in
1974, to enlarge and clarify the standards for judicial disqualification law"). See also
Comment, Questioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying Federal District Court
Judges Under28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 Temple L Q 697, 700 n 27 (1987).
75 Liljeberg v Health Services Acquisition Corp, 486 US 847, 865 (1988). See also HR
Rep No 93-1453 at 6, reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 6351, 6355.
76 See In re Yengo, 371 A2d 41, 46 (NJ 1977) (observing the importance of a judge's
"reputation" for impartiality within his "community" as a precondition for public confidence in the judiciary).
77 On "the need for a judicial system that not only is impartial in fact, but also appears to render disinterested justice," see Comment, 46 U Chi L Rev at 267 (cited in note

5).
78 See In re Del Rio, 256 NW 2d 727, 748 (Mich 1977) ("Impartiality, although a difficult goal to achieve with perfection, must be relentlessly pursued in order to insure the
rendering of fair, just determinations and to enhance public confidence in the judiciary.").
See also Comment, 24 Seton Hall L Rev at 2057 ("It has long been recognized that the
success of the judiciary depends, fundamentally, on public confidence in the judicial system.").
79 Duke, 668 F Supp at 1035-36 (emphasis added).
80 On the importance of impartial judges to the integrity of the justice system, see
Liljeberg, 486 US at 862-64, 874 (discussing how failure to disqualify a judge when appropriate risks undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process).
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even the appearance of impropriety to remain "casts disrepute
upon the judiciary."
When interpreting the judicial disqualification statute,
courts should acknowledge the conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety which stock ownership presents.' In the
words of Justice Frankfurter, "the administration of justice
should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be so in
fact.'
Achieving the goal of removing all actual and apparent
conflicts due to stock ownership requires automatic disqualification of judges who own stock in the victim of a crime.
C. Defendant's Rights
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
deprivation of "life, liberty or property without due process of
law."' The Supreme Court has held that this constitutional
guarantee requires that judges not harbor bias toward a criminal
defendant.' A judge's ownership of even a small financial interest may give rise to such bias, compromising the defendant's
right to a fair trial."

By allowing a judge to preside over the trial of a defendant
accused of victimizing a corporation in which the judge owns
stock, the current disqualification law abridges the defendant's
right to a trial before an impartial judge. When redrafting § 455,
Congress itself expressed concern over the possibility that a
judge's financial interest might infringe a defendant's due process
Shaman, et al, JudicialConduct and Ethics § 4.01 at 96 (cited in note 42).
There appears to be no empirical data on the extent to which the defendants themselves worry about the judge's potential bias. Criminal defendants, however do consider
judicial reputations for harsh treatment of defendants. See Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., DispensingJustice in Domestic Violence Cases:PretrialRelease and Sentencing of Offenders,
9 Crim Just J 8, 12 (Winter 1995); Michael S. Ross, Cooperation With FederalAuthorities:
Operatingon the OuterLimits, 12 Crim Just J 4, 62-63 (Summer 1997) (discussing incentives for judge-shopping created by Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
83 Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v Pollak, 343 US 451, 467
(1952). Justice Frankfurter disqualified himself from a case involving a streetcar company's broadcast of radio programs in its streetcars because his emotions were "so strongly
engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy." Id.
1 US Const Amend V.
85
Wong Yang Sung v McGrath, 339 US 33, 50 (1950) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that hearings must be fair and held "before a tribunal which meets at least
currently prevailing standards of impartiality"). On the appearance of impropriety as
inconsistent with a defendant's due process rights, see Aetna Life Insurance Co v Lavoie,
475 US 813, 825 (1986), quoting In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136 (1955) ("[T]o perform
its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice.').
86 Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510, 523-24 (1927) (holding that defendant was denied due
process where a town mayor tried a case under a statute which provided that the mayor's
salary was determined by the fines he assessed).
81

82
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rights. The House Report observed that "a judge's direct economic or financial interest, even though relatively small, in the
outcome of the case may well be inconsistent with due process.'
To make matters worse, certain practical problems make it
difficult for a defendant to challenge the presiding judge. First, a
defendant who asserts a Fifth Amendment claim in light of a
judge's stock ownership, ironically, may only further prejudice his
own case. By questioning the judge's ability to render an impartial verdict, the defendant might bias an initially impartial judge
against him.' Second, a defendant may lack the information necessary to assert a proper claim for disqualification. For example,
a defendant reasonably might want to know how long a judge
who refuses to recuse himself has owned the stock in question,
what percentage of the judge's entire investment portfolio the
stock constituted, or why the judge invested in that company in
the first place. Yet a defendant is not entitled to this information.' The judge is neither subject to any voir dire procedure nor
permitted to testify in court.' A rule of automatic disqualification for stock-owning judges would solve this evidentiary problem
and eliminate any possibility that a defendant's due process right
could be violated by a judge's stockownership.
D. Benefits of a Bright Line Rule
Only a handful of federal cases address the problem of the
stock-owning judge."s One might argue that the dearth of caselaw
87

Id.

88 Most judges, thinking themselves capable of objectively evaluating a case, react

poorly when someone questions their impartiality. Bernard L. Shientag, The Personality
of the Judge, in Donald K. Carroll, ed, Handbook for Judges 67 (American Judicature
Society 1961). Moreover, a lawyer may hesitate to challenge a lifetime-tenured federal
judge before whom he is likely to appear again because he may fear the judge will dislike
him. See also David C. Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualificationof FederalJudges, 30 U Kan
L Rev 255, 256 (1982) ("[B]oth lawyers and clients recognize the potentially disastrous
effects on their case of unsuccessfully seeking to disqualify a judge.").
89 This situation "calls on the very judge whose acts are alleged to be warped by unconscious bias to decide whether there is an adequate showing of bias." John Leubsdorf,
Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification,62 NYU L Rev 237, 242 (1987). Annual
financial disclosure statements which federal judges must file may, however, provide
defendants with a relatively up-to-date picture of the judge's finances. See ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 4H(2) (requiring a judge to report his annual compensation).
90 See Leubsdorf, 62 NYU L Rev at 242 & n 23, citing FRE 605 (judge may not testify
at trial).
91 See Part I. There is significantly more caselaw concerning the requirement that a
judge in a civil trial who owns stock in a party disqualify himself under § 455(b)(4). "A
judge who owns a single share of stock in a large corporation may not hear a suit for a few
hundred dollars against it...." Leubsdorf, 62 NYU L Rev at 238. In civil cases, the judge
usually owns stock in one of the corporate parties, and thus is disqualified under §
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indicates that most judges diligently recuse themselves from
criminal trials when they own stock in crime victims, rendering
any additional rule unnecessary. A recent survey of judges, however, suggests the opposite: "judges need more guidance as to
when they should recuse themselves from proceedings in which
their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' Forty-eight
percent of the judges surveyed favored disqualification when a
judge has a direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of
a case, while only sixteen percent of judges opposed disqualification.93
The current ambiguity in the disqualification statute has
created difficult line-drawing problems. How much stock in the
victim is too much? What level of financial interest in the victim,
to quote the language of 28 USC § 455(a), "might reasonably"
lead one to question the judge's "impartiality?" The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of § 455 indicates that a judge's ownership of
$100,000 in stock requires disqualification.' Ravich offers a
reading of the statute that suggests a judge's financial stake in
the victim of a crime must exceed $15,000 to merit his disqualification.95 Nobel deemed $10,000 sufficient to justify recusal.'
Even a very small interest arguably could raise the specter of
partiality.'
A per se rule requiring disqualification in such a case would
be preferable to the current procedure which relies on the discretion of the potentially biased judge. A rule requiring disqualification would remove the question from the judge. It would relieve
the judge from having to make a potentially difficult decision
about a situation in which he is personally involved. While a
judge understandably may feel a duty to hear the cases to which
he is assigned, Congress expressly rejected the "duty to sit" ra455(b)(4). See, for example, Tatum v Southern Pacific Company, 58 Cal Rptr 238, 239-240
(Cal App 1967) (judge disqualified for ownership of stock in corporate defendant).
92
Jona Goldschmidt and Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Disqualification: What do
Judges Think? 80 Judicature 68 (Sept-Oct 1996). The American Judicature Society
mailed surveys to 972 judges in four states chosen for their geographical diversity: Arkansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Ohio. Fifty-nine percent, or 571 judges, responded to
the survey. Id at 69 n 2.
93 Id at 70. The remaining 36 percent were labeled "ambivalent." Id.
94 First National Bank of Louisville v Lustig, 96 F3d 1554, 1561, nn 5, 6 (5th Cir
1996).
95 United States v Ravich, 421 F2d 1196, 1205 (2d Cir 1970). Adjusted for inflation,
this amount would be worth approximately $57,000 today. NASA Parametric Cost Estimating Reference Manual, (http//www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflate.html).
96 UnitedStates v Nobel, 696 F2d 231, 235-236 & n 4 (3d Cir 1983).
97 See In re VirginiaElectric & Power Co., 539 F2d 357, 368 (4th Cir 1976) ("What is
a small sum to one person may not be to another.").
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tionale for a judge's refusal to disqualify himself from a case in
which he has a conflict of interest.98 A bright line rule requiring
disqualification in these circumstances would comport with the
statute and would rid the justice system of the burden of making
these nettlesome judgment-calls.
The administrative costs to the judicial system of an automatic disqualification rule would be minimal.' Because the particular type of stock ownership that is the subject of this Comment occurs rarely, a bright line rule1" would require few disqualifications."0 This rule would thus pose a minimal reassignment burden and would not significantly slow the efficient administration of justice. 2 The strengthening of the justice system
that would result more than justifies this small reassignment
burden - a "burden" that might be less significant than the cost
of appellate
litigation resulting from the current ambiguous re10 3
gime.
One criticism of requiring disqualification is that criminal
trials are typically fact-intensive, presenting clear-cut legal issues. According to this argument, the threat of favoritism is
minimal because of the transparency of any bias. Obvious bias
would impugn both the judge's credibility and make the errones8 See HR Rep No 93-1453, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN at
6352, 6355. See also Note, JudicialDisqualificationin the Federal Courts: Maintaining
an Appearance of Justice Under 28 USC § 455, 1978 U Ill Lawyer F 863, 869-70 (1978);
Litteneker, 46 U Chi L Rev at 241, 267 (cited in note 75).
99 On the balancing of the twin goals of impartiality and efficiency, see Seth E.
Bloom, Judicial Bias and FinancialInterest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal
Judges, 35 Case W L Rev 662, 663-65 (1985).
100 Under the automatic disqualification rule proposed here, if a judge does not discover that he owns stock in the victim of the crime until he has already presided over a
significant portion of a criminal trial, he should immediately divest himself of the stock,
but need not withdraw from the case. Although the rule would still eliminate any potential conflict of interest, this modification would reduce the burden of retrials on a justice
system already overburdened by crowded dockets. This is similar to the approach that
judges who learn of disqualifying interests in civil cases take. See Kidder, Peabody & Co,
Inc v Maxus Energy Corp, 925 F2d 556, 561 (2d Cir 1991) (holding that the judge did not
have to disqualify himself even though he and his wife owned stock in a party because the
judge sold the stock as soon as he learned of the corporation's interest in the case). See
also NEC Corp v Intel Corp, 654 F Supp 1256, 1257-58 (N D Cal 1987) (holding that disqualification of the judge on the grounds that he owned a financial interest in a party
applied only to the rulings made after he learned of the disqualifying interest).
101 This Comment does not call for a more liberal use of disqualification in general but
rather discusses a narrowly-defined, discrete situation in which disqualification is appropriate. On the forum-shopping problems created by over-use of disqualification see Justice Rehnquist's explanatory memorandum concerning his decision not to disqualify himself in Laird v Tatum, 408 US 1 (1971), reprinted at 409 US 824 (1972).
102 On this concern, see VirginiaElectric & Power Co, 539 F2d at 363.
103 See generally Hoekema, 60 Temp L Q at 726-35 (cited in note 74) (observing the
strengthening of the justice system which results from an impartial judiciary).
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ous rulings ripe for reversal on appeal. However, this criticism
does not consider that some criminal trials are factually and legally complex, especially when the alleged crime is a sophisticated financial offense." Moreover, it seems wiser to prevent a
conflict that could produce bias than to wait for the favoritism to
manifest itself and rely on the appellate courts to undo any injustice after the fact.
CONCLUSION

The conflict presented when a judge owns stock in the victim
of a crime is an unusual but important one. Current disqualification law does not specifically require recusal in this situation.
This is not entirely surprising. Judges live in the real world and
engage in all kinds of activities, including certain financial investments, which the drafters of the disqualification regulations
may not have contemplated. The absence of a specific provision
addressing the problem ofjudicial stockownership in the victim of
the crime does not, however, indicate that the threat to the judiciary posed by this problem is minimal. Rather, the absence of a
specific ban is likely attributable to the rarity rather than the
severity of the problem.
Allowing a judge who owns stock in the victim of a crime to
preside over the criminal trial poses several threats to the justice
system. The judge may in fact harbor bias for or against the
criminal defendant as a result of the judge's financial position.
Even if the judge does not harbor bias, the appearance of impropriety created by the conflict undermines public confidence in the
judiciary. Either of these results abridges the rights of a criminal
defendant. Moreover, judges themselves acknowledge that they
are unsure if disqualification is appropriate in this situation.
Finally, determining what amount of stock is sufficient to require
disqualification entails arbitrary boundaries.
By contrast, the sole drawback of a bright line rule requiring
automatic disqualification when a judge owns stock in the victim
of a crime is the potential small increase in the number of cases
reassigned. Because the stock ownership problem discussed in
this Comment occurs infrequently, the cost of establishing a
bright line rule would be minimal. A minor administrative inconvenience is a small price for a rule which would rid the justice
See William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 Brooklyn L Rev 781, 856-57 (1988)
(discussing the factual and legal complexity of contemporary financial crimes and advocating the adoption of new prosecutorial and law enforcement techniques to combat them).
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system of conflicts of interest which currently undermine both the
legitimacy and fairness of the criminal justice system.

